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Abstract: A framework is proposed for organizing phenomena related to the (mis)prediction 
of utility, in particular neglecting adaptation. A categorization is introduced that accounts for 
asymmetries in misprediction. In decision-making, goods and activities satisfying extrinsic 
desires are more salient than those serving intrinsic needs. Accordingly, there is an over-
consumption of the former compared to the latter. The theoretical analysis is consistent with 
econometric evidence on commuting choice using data on subjective well-being. People 
show substantial adaptation to a higher labor income but not to commuting. This may 
account for the finding that people are not compensated for the burden of commuting. 
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Economic Consequences of Mispredicting Utility 
 
I. The Issue 
Consider a job offer promising an increase in income of $ 30,000 a year, but which is farther 
away from where you live. Due to a longer commute, you will have less time available for 
your family and friends, hobbies, gardening and dancing. How will you decide?  
We argue that individuals systematically mispredict utility in such choice situations. They 
underestimate the utility relating to aspects of consumption satisfying intrinsic needs (time 
spent with family and friends or on hobbies). In contrast, the characteristics relating to 
consumption satisfying extrinsic desires (income and status) are overvalued. As a 
consequence, individuals tend to under-consume goods and activities with strong intrinsic 
attributes, compared to those with strong extrinsic attributes. According to their own 
subjective evaluation, individuals make distorted decisions when they choose between 
different options and obtain a lower utility level than they otherwise would.  
The argument is based on the notion that individuals find it difficult to make comparisons 
between attributes, whose salience shifts over time. Specifically, people fail to make an 
accurate prediction of adaptation. Moreover, adaptation and the degree of its prediction 
systematically differ across goods and activities. We propose the nature of needs that choices 
are satisfying as differentiation criteria, emphasizing the intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of 
choice options. It is hypothesized that people adapt less to intrinsically rewarding activities 
and goods than to extrinsic satisfiers. We take two propositions that are derived from our 
arguments and empirically test them when applied to commuting decisions. First, we study 
whether people commute too much in the sense that they are not fully compensated for the 
burden of commuting. Second, we analyze whether there is differential adaptation to a higher 
labor income and an increase in commuting time. Our findings, based on panel data on 
reported life satisfaction for Germany, show substantial adaptation to a higher labor income, 
but sensitization, albeit small, to commuting. This result can account for the paradoxical 
observation that people are not fully compensated for the burden of commuting. 
This paper intends to make three contributions. First, a simple conceptual framework is 
proposed to organize a multitude of phenomena related to the prediction of utility in research 
in economics and psychology. This allows them to be introduced into economics. Second, 
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based on the categorization of goods and activities as predominantly characterized by 
extrinsic or intrinsic attributes, testable predictions are derived about the economic 
consequences in terms of distorted choices. Third, an empirical strategy is developed, based 
on data on reported subjective well-being to test for utility misprediction.  
Section II discusses individual decision-making, where the salience of the characteristics of 
goods and activities differs from the moment when people make a decision to the period of 
consumption. Section III gives reasons why people mispredict utility and undervalue the 
intrinsic attributes of choice options when compared to the extrinsic attributes. We draw on 
both psychological and institutional insights and refer to related phenomena. The following 
section IV raises the question why there is little or no learning in utility misprediction. 
Section V provides an econometric analysis for a specific, but important example; the 
income/commuting trade-off discussed at the outset. Section VI draws concluding remarks. 
II. Individual Decision-Making When the Salience of Attributes 
Changes 
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals are able to compare the future utilities 
provided by the goods and activities consumed, and that they maximize their own utility in a 
rational consumption decision. In certain cases, it has proved useful to distinguish between 
the various characteristics of goods and activities (Lancaster 1966, Becker 1965) or the 
different attributes of options (e.g. Keeney and Raiffa 1976). However, this differentiation is 
not taken to affect the evaluation of future utility. The utility of a chosen combination is 
simply the sum of the weighted value of each characteristic. 
The standard economic model of consumer decisions is appropriate for most goods and 
activities and for most situations. It is also appropriate when individuals make random 
prediction errors, or when the extent of misprediction is the same for all goods and all 
activities. 
This paper diverges from the assumptions of the revealed preference approach underlying 
standard economics in two significant ways: 
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First, we allow for the fact that people mispredict utility1; i.e. ex ante predicted utility from 
different choice options (that is supposed to guide people’s behavior) does not match with 
actual ex post experienced utility.2 In order to generate a tractable framework, we simply 
represent this misprediction as a change in the salience (or the weight) given to different 
attributes of goods and activities in people’s evaluations (ex ante and ex post). Different 
sources of utility misprediction are discussed in the next section. 
Second, we argue that there are systematic differences in misprediction and focus on the 
attributes of choice options. Only with this additional presumption is a directed hypothesis 
about distorted behavior possible. In this second conceptual step, we differentiate between 
two types of attributes characterizing various options.3 
 Attributes of the first type relate to ‘intrinsic needs’. A comprehensive view of the main 
aspects of intrinsic needs is provided in the self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan 
(e.g. 2000). First, there is a need for relatedness, referring to the desire to feel connected 
to others through love and affection (having family and friends and being in a social 
setting). Second, a need for competence refers to the propensity to control the 
environment and experience oneself as capable and effective. Third, a desire for autonomy 
involves the experience of being in charge of one’s actions or being causal.4 Intrinsic need 
attributes are also characterized as providing “flow experience” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990), 
i.e. when one is completely immersed in an activity, often a hobby.  
 The second type of attributes relates to ‘extrinsic desires’. Extrinsic attributes serve 
people’s goals for material possessions, fame, status or prestige. Income thus becomes a 
crucial aspect of options in the choice set. A high income allows for a high standard of 
living in material terms.  
                                                
1 The misprediction of utility has recently also been introduced in the series on anomalies in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Kahneman and Thaler 2006).  
2 This terminology follows the work of Kahneman et al. (1997) in which utility is interpreted as a 
hedonic experience. Both utility measures – predicted and experienced utility – diverge from 
traditional decision utility that is derived from individual behavior.  
3 We borrow these categories from a large literature in humanistic or value psychology (e.g. Maslow 
1968, Rogers 1961). 
4 The underlying theories are manifold, and include the urge to master one’s environment for its own 
sake (White 1959) to be an origin (DeCharms 1968), to resist loss of control (Brehm 1966) and the 
reflection of perceived control in more effective behavior and higher positive affects (Bandura 1977, 
Seligman 1992). 
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Each option, activity and even good is multidimensional; in general, a particular choice 
alternative has both intrinsic and extrinsic need attributes or, in short, intrinsic and extrinsic 
attributes. But some goods and activities are more intrinsic by nature (e.g. time spent with 
friends)5, while others are more extrinsic by nature, like consumer articles that go beyond 
basic material needs (e.g. designer clothes). In this analysis, we neglect the satisfaction of 
physiological needs and concentrate on the gratification of needs through time and income 
that are available for discretionary use. 
Our main proposition is that, when making a decision, the extrinsic attributes are relatively 
more salient than the intrinsic attributes of different options. When it comes to decision-
making, individuals therefore tend to undervalue the future utility of intrinsic attributes 
compared to extrinsic attributes.  This distortion leads to a systematic discrepancy between 
predicted utility and experienced utility. 
III. (Asymmetric) Adaptation and Other Potential Sources for 
Mispredicting Utility 
1. Underestimating Adaptation 
There is convincing empirical evidence that individuals are not good at foreseeing how much 
utility they will derive from future consumption (e.g. Loewenstein and Adler 1995). For an 
extensive survey, see Wilson and Gilbert (2003).6 Research on affective forecasting shows, in 
particular, that people tend to overestimate their reactions to specific events because they are 
embedded within other daily life events that they are not currently aware off: for instance, 
seeing their favorite soccer team win is experienced simultaneously with other events 
occurring in the environment. Another example of errors in predicting emotions is that people 
                                                
5 When people spend time with friends because they are famous or important, the extrinsic dimension 
becomes more prevalent.  
6 Standard research designs are prospective longitudinal studies about self-reported emotions. People 
are asked how happy they expect themselves to be after an event has occurred or after an option has 
been chosen. These predictions are then compared with reported subjective well-being when actually 
experiencing the new situation. There are several limits to this design: (i) Usually only predictions for 
changes in the near future are assessed. (ii) The way in which scales of measurement are interpreted 
can change over time, e.g., due to maturation or a change in the anchor. (iii) Predictions might also 
affect actual feelings or even become self-fulfilling prophecies. Some of these problems can be 
eliminated by conducting studies between subjects, where one group’s predictions are contrasted with 
another group’s actual reports. 
  6 
underestimate their ability to successfully cope with negative events.7 The general notion is 
that people usually have biased expectations about the intensity and duration of emotions, in 
the sense that the emotional impact is often lower than predicted because people adapt more 
than they foresee. 
We argue that adaptation is more likely to be underestimated for extrinsic aspects than for 
intrinsic aspects. People adapt less to goods and activities with strong intrinsic components 
because the (positive) experience tends to be renewed with every new act of consumption. 
Getting together with a good friend is always rewarding, and one does not get used to it in the 
sense of valuing this experience less and less. Rather, the opposite is true. Each interaction 
with the friend provides fresh pleasure and enjoyment. Similarly, many scholars have a flow 
experience when they immerse themselves in writing a paper or book they always wanted to 
write. The corresponding utility does not wear off. Thus, many senior scholars, who have 
written numerous papers and books in the past, experience the same flow as when they were 
young. 
The differential effect on the intrinsic and extrinsic attributes of goods and activities is 
consistent with much of the recent empirical evidence (for a survey, see Frederick and 
Loewenstein 1999). It has been found that individuals do not adapt their utility evaluation in 
the case of undesirable experiences that inhibit intrinsic need satisfaction. In particular, severe 
health problems, like chronic illness, or illness that gets progressively worse, reduces 
autonomy and leads to lasting reductions in reported subjective well-being (e.g. Easterlin 
2005). People also do not fully adapt to positive intrinsic need fulfillment. This is, the case, 
for example, for marriage supporting the desire to be connected to others through love and 
affection (Clark et al. 2008, Stutzer and Frey 2006). Having a job is related to many aspects 
that provide flow experiences and satisfy intrinsic needs, like being in the company of 
workmates, applying expertise and experiencing autonomy. Accordingly, being unemployed 
is repeatedly found to have high negative non-pecuniary effects on people’s subjective well-
being, with little habituation (Clark et al. 2001). By way of contrast, having a job with a high 
degree of autonomy, as in the case of self-employed people, is related to high job satisfaction. 
                                                
7 Young academics might be particularly worried about life after a negative tenure decision. Gilbert et 
al. (1998) asked assistant professors how happy they thought they would be after a positive and a 
negative tenure decision. The answers were compared with the reported subjective well-being of 
academics affected by a tenure decision made five or less years previously. Although assistants 
predicted they would be less happy in the first five years after being turned down, there was no 
statistically significant difference between those who had and had not gotten tenure. Similarly, 
assistants also overestimated the positive impact of receiving tenure on their subjective well-being. 
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Thus Benz and Frey (2004) show that self-employed people derive more utility from their work 
than people employed by an organization, irrespective of income earned or hours worked. 
Moreover, they can explain this difference by people’s evaluation of the use of initiative at their 
work place and their satisfaction with the actual work itself. Intrinsic attributes also characterize 
volunteer work. It is found that people doing volunteer work are more satisfied with their life in 
general, even when the possibility of reverse causality is accounted for (Meier and Stutzer 2008). 
In contrast, there is empirical evidence that individuals experience a considerable extent of 
adaptation in the case of goods and activities in which the extrinsic aspects are dominant. In 
particular, this has been demonstrated for income (van Praag 1993, Easterlin 2001, Stutzer 
2004, Di Tella et al. 2006). When individuals experience a rise in income, their utility level at 
first increases but, after a year or so, most of this beneficial effect has evaporated. It has been 
estimated (van Herwaarden et al. 1977) that around 60% of the utility increase due to a higher 
position in the income distribution disappears over time.  
The evidence of little adaptation for goods and activities characterized by intrinsic aspects, 
and strong adaptation for those characterized by extrinsic aspects, suggests that individuals 
who underestimate adaptation, or even disregard adaptation altogether, tend to make a bigger 
mistake when predicting future utility from extrinsic attributes than from intrinsic attributes. 
2. Distorted Memory of Past Experiences 
When individuals - in the absence of information on current experience - make decisions 
about future consumption, or allocation of time, they have to refer to past experiences. People 
reflect on specific moments from the past or access generalizations about likely emotions in a 
particular type of situation (for a discussion, see Robinson and Clore 2002). If specific 
information is available, it has priority in people’s judgment. Thereby, the more memorable 
moments of an experience disproportionately affect retrospective assessments of feelings 
(Kahneman 1999). What counts as “ more memorable” tends to be the most intense moment 
(peak) and the most recent moment (end) of an emotional event. This peak-end rule or 
duration neglect has been established in many experimental tests (Kahneman 2003). 
Intrinsic attributes are seen to relate to long-term experiences of moderate but enduring 
positive feelings. In order to be open to renewed enjoyment of the type of interactions 
mentioned above, as well as to be able to immerse oneself in a flow experience, time is 
needed. In contrast, extrinsic attributes are related to short-term experiences, in particular 
peak emotions. As a result, we argue that the intrinsic aspects of goods and activities related 
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to their duration (compared to the extrinsic aspects related to peaks) are underestimated when 
people predict utility based on retrospection. 
3. Rationalization of Decisions 
Individuals have a strong urge to justify their decisions, both to themselves and to other 
people (for pre-decision justification, see Shafir et al. 1993). Not only does predicted 
consumption utility affect, for instance, consumption decisions, but also whether people think 
that they are getting a bargain (Thaler 1999). There is a general tendency to resist affective 
influences and to take rationalistic attributes into account when making decisions. Hsee et al. 
(2003) call this reason-based choice “lay rationalism”. In experiments, they find, for instance, 
that people focus their decisions on absolute economic payoffs and play down non-economic 
concerns. Other experiments find that people emphasize aspects of events that are easy to 
articulate and neglect aspects that are important for experience when asked to give reasons 
during the decision-making phase (e.g. Wilson and Schooler 1991). Similarly, people seem to 
base their choices on rules and principles, and to bypass predictions on the experiential 
consequences of their choices (e.g. Prelec and Herrnstein 1991). These arguments imply that 
people do not optimally consider the various attributes of different options so that predicted 
utility would be maximized. 
We argue that, for extrinsic and intrinsic attributes, there is a similar inconsistency when it 
comes to decision-making. It is much easier to provide rationalistic justifications for extrinsic 
rather than intrinsic characteristics. Consider again the job offer providing more income but 
less leisure-time. Most people will find it much easier to justify both to themselves and to 
others why they should accept the job offer, as the extrinsic monetary dimension is salient. In 
contrast, it is quite difficult to justify why the intrinsic characteristics provided by more 
leisure-time (even when its hedonic utility might be correctly predicted) are important enough 
to refuse the large increase in money. As a result, goods and activities characterized by strong 
intrinsic attributes tend to carry little weight when it comes to decision-making, compared to 
extrinsic components. 
4. Intuitive Theories about the Sources of Utility 
People have very diverse intuitive theories about what makes them happy (for a discussion 
see Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). These beliefs have a direct influence on people 
predicting future utility and can cause them to make mistakes. Moreover, these beliefs play a 
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role because they shape the reconstruction of past emotions and make them consistent with 
current self-conceptions or beliefs (Ross 1989). Thus, intuitive theories interact with the three 
previously discussed sources of misprediction. 
An important belief refers to acquisition and possession as important goals on the way to 
happiness, i.e. materialism (e.g. Tatzel 2002 for a discussion in economics). It is found that 
people with material or extrinsic life goals report lower self-esteem and life satisfaction than 
people with intrinsic life goals (e.g. Kasser and Ryan 1996, Sirgy 1997). This correlation is 
probably partly due to confounding factors, like unobserved personality traits and reversed 
causality due to a compensatory reaction of people with low subjective well-being. However, 
it might also indicate that people who believe intuitively in extrinsic attributes are prone to 
mispredict future utility. In contrast, people with intrinsic life goals for personal growth, 
relationships and community spirit apply intuitive theories that emphasize intrinsic attributes, 
which in turn lead to fewer mispredictions in future utility. Our argument thus includes 
heterogeneity among individuals that leads to additional testable predictions when combined 
with previous reasons for misprediction. 
5. Institutional Conditions 
The differential effect of misprediction between intrinsic and extrinsic attributes also depends 
on the extent to which the market enters into the matter. The monetarization of a good or 
activity induces individuals to focus more on extrinsic attributes than they otherwise would. 
This applies to both work and consumption. It has been argued that introducing pay for 
performance leads employees to regard those performance aspects, which are relevant for the 
compensation they receive, as predominant. In contrast, aspects of performance irrelevant to 
pay are crowded-out (see Frey 1997 and, for a survey of empirical evidence, Frey and Jegen 
2001). In the area of consumption, advertising is often aimed at extrinsic aspects of the goods 
to be sold. In comparison, lobbies for intrinsic values tend to be weak and sometimes do not 
exist at all. To the extent to which “commercialization” occurs (see e.g. Kuttner 1997, Lane 
1991), individuals are induced to mispredict the future utility of goods. They are led to 
believe that the extrinsic characteristics will make them happier than is actually the case 
compared to the intrinsic characteristics.  
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6. Related Phenomena 
The propositions developed in this section link up to various strands of literature where 
related phenomena have been identified: 
 The aspect of underestimated adaptation to new situations has been neatly introduced into 
theoretical models of intertemporal decision-making (Loewenstein et al. 2003). Based on 
their model of projection bias, various phenomena can be modeled like, e.g., the 
misguided purchase of durable goods or consumption profiles with too high consumption 
early on in life. Misprediction of utility thus provides an alternative to seemingly irrational 
saving behavior that is usually addressed in a framework of individuals with self-control 
problems. In Loewenstein et al. (2003), however, there is no explicit modeling of 
differences in adaptation across goods, attributes of different options or people.  
 It has been argued that the “work-life” balance of individuals nowadays is distorted. 
People are induced to work too hard, and to disregard other aspects of life. This 
proposition has been forcefully put forward for the United States, where individuals are 
said to be “overworked” (Schor 1991). This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
individuals tend to focus too much on options characterized by strong extrinsic attributes, 
in particular income, rather than on intrinsic attributes. 
 Competing for status involves negative externalities and therefore too much effort is 
invested in gaining status and acquiring “positional goods” (Frank 1985, 1999). Such 
goods are characterized by very strong extrinsic attributes. The saying “Keeping up with 
the Jones’s” reveals that consumption is externally oriented. Thus, misprediction of utility 
is likely to magnify the distortions of status competition through consumption.  
 Procedural utility, i.e. the satisfaction derived from the process itself rather than from its 
outcome, refers to innate needs. The utility derived from a particular process contributes 
to competence, relatedness and autonomy, and is therefore closely related to the intrinsic 
attributes of goods and activities (see the survey by Frey et al. 2004). According to our 
propositions, sources of procedural utility are likely to be underestimated in people’s 
decision-making. Consistent with this idea, it has been empirically shown (Tyler et al. 
1999) that, when making decisions, individuals tend to prefer institutions promising 
favorable outcomes. But they state ex post that they would have preferred an institution 
putting more emphasis on (just) procedures. 
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 There is a long tradition in economics arguing that individuals tend to focus too much on 
material goods and disregard goods providing non-material benefits (see Lebergott 1993, 
Lane 1991). Most importantly, Scitovsky (1976) claimed that “comfort goods” are over-
consumed compared to goods providing “stimulation”. Comfort goods are described as 
defensive activities, protecting against negative affect. They have a strong extrinsic 
component, consisting of the consumer goods achieved through rapid productivity 
growth. In contrast, stimulation comes from creative activities providing novelty, surprise, 
variety and complexity. These aspects accentuate the renewal of pleasurable experiences, 
as it is also emphasized for intrinsic attributes. Unlike our theory, stimulation is at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to comfort goods because of the higher access costs 
and because consumers are myopic about the future benefits from stimulating activities. 
IV. Why Is There Little or No Learning? 
Systematically mispredicting future utilities, even if they differed between goods and 
activities, would be of little consequence for economics if individuals would learn quickly in 
repetitive choice situations.8 If this were the case, mispredicting would be a disequilibrium 
phenomenon, not basically affecting the notion of rational decision-makers maximizing 
individual utility. 
A large literature suggests, however, that learning is a complex process, which does not 
necessarily lead to overcoming mispredictions. It is likely to do this if multi-dimensional 
goods and activities are reduced to essentially one dimension, which can be expressed in 
monetary terms. In that case, the individual can be expected to be able to rectify his or her 
mistakes to a large extent within a short period of time. Standard economic models then apply 
fully. 
In the choice situation considered here, where the importance of various attributes differ 
between the point of time when people have to make a decision and actual consumption time, 
learning is much more difficult. Where decisions on future consumption are concerned, 
learning must often be based on the recollection of past feelings. They are therefore subject to 
the same misperceptions as remembering the utility of past experiences (see previous section 
on distorted memory). Learning is particularly hampered when there are too few episodic 
                                                
8 In contrast, learning is not an option when it comes to once-in-a-lifetime choices. Biased decisions 
can then well affect one’s life path. We believe that misprediction of utility matters greatly when it 
comes to important life decisions (like career choice), but we have not studied them here. 
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memories and people rely to a large extent on their intuitive theories (Robinson and Clore 
2002). In consequence, remembered utility and predicted utility become similar and relatively 
independent of the utility actually experienced. Mitchell et al. (1997), for example, document 
this phenomenon in three survey studies of different types of vacation; tourists traveling to 
Europe, students going home for Thanksgiving and students making a cycling tour in 
California. Participants in the studies were asked how much enjoyment they anticipated, 
actually experienced and later remembered in connection with their vacation. Although 
participants enjoy the actual trip less than predicted, they report enjoyment levels similar to 
the ones predicted before the trip when they recall the experience later. 
Learning, in contrast, is easier when people can access their feelings directly, i.e., while still 
experiencing a particular situation. It might even inspire them to adopt institutional 
preconditions to sustain optimal decisions after the event. Most of us are familiar with the 
experience of not getting together with friends as often as we would really like when 
reflecting on it immediately after the meeting. It is difficult to imagine how enjoyable it was 
once we are back in our daily routine and have to find time in our busy schedules. One of the 
authors experimented with trying to overcome this particular problem by fixing a new date 
whilst still with the friends and aware of the pleasure of being in their company. It resulted in 
getting together more frequently and enjoying the meetings to the same extent as before. On 
another note, moments of pure bliss and very traumatic experiences can abruptly change 
people’s intuitive theories about what constitutes happiness. 
In general, however, a more elaborate learning process is required. The individual needs to 
step back from his or her actual decision-making activity, where the extrinsic characteristics 
dominate over the intrinsic characteristics. He or she should attempt to make an overall 
evaluation, including undertaking some critical self-examination, or resort to what has been 
called “double-loop learning” (see Argyris and Schön 1978). As such elaborate learning is 
more costly, and is itself subject to errors, individuals are not able to fully correct their 
mispredictions within a reasonably short period of time. In many cases, they are not capable 
of making any correction, so that the misprediction of future utilities persists over time. 
Limited learning can well co-exist with people’s partial awareness of themselves or others 
mispredicting utility.9 Many people talk, for example, about the difficulties and mistakes they 
                                                
9 Systematic differences between self-evaluation and the assessment of others’ decisions are likely due 
to over-optimism (Weinstein 1981). Thus people are overly confident about their own ability to make 
the right decisions, while at the same time being aware that the average person mispredicts utility. 
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experience in balancing their working life with their personal life. Yet, on a case-by-case 
basis, they still make decisions underestimating intrinsic attributes relative to extrinsic 
attributes.10 
A more fundamental reason for a person’s limited learning capacity might lie in the 
functionality of misprediction in the evolutionary process. Rayo and Becker (2007) model 
how humans’ utility functions formed in order to maximize success in genetic replication. 
Their model rationalizes that people neglect adaptation (described as self-inflicted 
externality). However, in today’s world, this utility function with an inbuilt misprediction 
may no longer be helpful in guaranteeing an optimal mix between experienced utility and 
motivation for success in society. 
V. Empirical Application to Commuting Choice 
When people choose between different jobs and different possible places of residence, they 
face the difficult decision of how far they are prepared to commute.11 It involves challenging 
trade-offs, often along the line that housing further away would be more exclusive for the 
same price, or a job further away would come with a higher salary. Based on the hypothesis 
that, when making decisions, people systematically underestimate future utility from the 
intrinsic attributes of goods and activities compared to extrinsic attributes, it is possible to 
predict individuals’ choices concerning different jobs and different places of residence. He or 
she can be expected to underestimate an important aspect, namely commuting time. Time 
spent commuting is no longer available for spending with friends and family members or 
indulging in a favorite hobby, i.e., intrinsically rewarding activities. People mispredict utility 
when they choose a job/housing situation and end up spending too much time commuting. Job 
                                                
10 This argument is similar to the ones about sophisticated and naive people, who are fully or not at all 
aware of their future self-control problem (for a discussion of self awareness, see O’Donoghue and 
Rabin 2003). 
11 In an empirical analysis, Simonsohn (2006) provides related evidence for the inherent complexity of 
commuting choice. He argues that commuting behavior can be better understood in a framework of 
constructed preferences. People come up with some reference level of commuting time or commuting 
radius that they are only prepared to give up after experiencing negative effects on their well-being. In 
a challenging study on people moving from one US city to another, Simonsohn finds that people 
coming from a city where the average commuting time of the population is high (or low) also choose 
to commute more (or less) than average at their new place of residence (keeping individuals’ own past 
commuting experience constant). In the latter model, people can end up either commuting too much or 
too little. 
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and housing choices are often costly to correct, so that people are trapped afterwards in an 
unfavorable commuting situation with a burden that is not compensated. 
In order to empirically test the general hypothesis of “too much commuting”, first a 
benchmark of optimal commuting is necessary. Second, to substantiate the claim that 
commuting time is underestimated, evidence for a specific asymmetry in people’s evaluations 
needs to be found. In the following, empirical tests are proposed, encompassing both 
directions, panel data for Germany are introduced and the results are shown.  
1. Constructing an Empirical Test for Full Compensation 
The prediction in neoclassical economics of individuals making perfectly rational decisions is 
taken as a reference standard for optimal commuting. In standard economics, people are 
assumed to have little difficulty with optimization when goods and activities have multiple 
characteristics. Commuting is like any other characteristic. Monetary costs involved and 
physical or mental stress12 enter negatively into the evaluation, and have to be offset by other 
characteristics, like income or lower housing costs. Only then is it likely that a job offer 
involving a longer commuting time may be chosen. This basic idea of compensation is the 
driving force behind the notion of equilibrium in urban location theory (e.g. Alonso 1964, 
Moses 1962), as well as in public economic theory, based on Tiebout’s (1956) model of fiscal 
competition between jurisdictions. Accordingly, commuting is determined by an equilibrium 
state of the housing and labor market, in which people’s utility is equalized over all actual 
combinations of alternatives in these two markets.13  
Utility U is thus equal to U  for realized combinations of income yi, time spent commuting Di 
and rent ri across individuals indexed by i 
  Ui = u(yi ,Di ,ri ) =U i        (1) 
                                                
12 It is well documented that commuting is both physically and mentally stressful (e.g. Novaco et al. 
1990). The strain of commuting is associated with raised blood pressure, musculoskeletal disorders, 
lowered frustration tolerance, increased anxiety and hostility, being in a negative mood when going to 
work in the morning and coming home in the evening, increased lateness, absenteeism and turnover at 
work, as well as adverse effects on cognitive performance (Koslowsky et al. 1995).   
13 The strong notion of equilibrium has only been partially tested so far. It has not been studied 
whether there are systematic rents: rather, derived hypotheses within the equilibrium framework have 
been analyzed. There is considerable evidence for capitalization of transportation infrastructure in the 
price of land and for compensating wage differentials due to commuting distance. However, these 
findings do not require an equilibrium situation, and can also be explained by the law of marginal 
substitution (e.g. Timothy and Wheaton 2001, van Ommeren 2000). 
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Totally differentiating this equilibrium condition leads to 
  dU =
u
y
dy+
u
D
dD+
u
r
dr = 0       (2) 
For variation in commuting time D, this implies that 
  
dU
dD
=
u
y
dy
dD
+
u
D
+
u
r
dr
dD
= 0       (3) 
The left hand side of equation (3) states that the overall change in utility due to a change in 
the disamenity cost of commuting time is zero. A decomposition of the total change is 
provided on the right hand side of equation (3). There are three effects from an increase in 
commuting time: there is a marginal gain in utility due to a higher level of consumption that is 
reached because jobs that require longer commutes offer a higher income. Moreover, longer 
commuting time reduces rents for housing and thus leaves additional money for consumption. 
Besides these two positive effects, there is a marginal decrease in utility due to the burden of 
spending more time commuting. Given that incomes and rents for housing exclusively reflect 
compensation for commuting conditions, the three effects add up to zero. 
The prediction in equation (3) can be directly tested, provided utility is observable. Stutzer 
and Frey (2008) set up such a test, taking commuters’ reported satisfaction with life as a 
proxy measure for individually experienced utility.14 The idea for the empirical test is 
captured in the following regression equation 
  ui =  + Di +  i        (4) 
The coefficient  measures the total change in utility due to a change in commuting time. 
Under the null hypothesis  = 0, commuting time is entirely compensated either by higher 
salaries or by lower rents for housing. This is the prediction of standard economic theory, 
assuming full compensation of the cost of commuting through higher income and lower 
housing costs. The alternative hypothesis  < 0 states that commuting time is not fully 
compensated on the labor and housing market.  < 0 is predicted when commuters 
systematically underestimate the costs of commuting and accept jobs or choose housing that 
do not fully compensate them. 
                                                
14 This approach follows a substantial recent literature on reported subjective well-being, satisfaction 
and happiness in economics (e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b, Layard 2005, Di Tella and MacCulloch 
2006), as well as in psychology (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1999, Diener et al. 1999). 
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The actual regression estimated below with panel data takes individual heterogeneity into 
account. In particular, a large set of covariates X of reported life satisfaction, as well as 
individual and time specific effects i and t are controlled for:  
  uit = + Dit +Xit + i +  t + it      (5) 
No job or housing related variables (most importantly labor income) are included. This is 
crucial, because income is one of the variables through which people are expected to be 
compensated for their daily journey to and from work. Equation (5) only makes a clear 
prediction of  = 0 if all sources of compensation remain uncontrolled.15 
2. Construction of the Empirical Test for Differential Adaptation 
A crucial aspect of whether trade-offs lead to systematically distorted decisions because of 
utility misprediction rests on some sort of asymmetry in the degree of misprediction across 
choice options. We emphasize the differential adaptation to goods and activities that satisfy 
intrinsic and extrinsic needs. In the case of commuting, commuting time refers to intrinsic 
needs while labor income is one possible variable that refers to extrinsic needs.  
Adaptation to repeated stimuli can be studied using multiple reports of a person’s subjective 
well-being. As we want to understand misprediction involved in people’s more or less 
deliberate choices, we study adaptation to variation in circumstances that are brought about by 
the normal course of life rather than by some external shocks. Moreover, the set of covariates 
of reported life satisfaction is extended to include working hours and labor income in order to 
separate adaptation to the major characteristics of someone’s work and commuting situation.16 
For the empirical analysis, equation (5) is extended to include current and lagged variables of 
the major choice variables, i.e. commuting time, labor income y and working hours h: 
  
uit = + 1Dit + 2Dit1 + 3Dit2 + 4Dit3 +
1 ln yit +  2 ln yit1 +  3 ln yit2 +  4 ln yit3 +
1hit + 2hit1 + 3hit2 + 4hit3 +Xit + i +  t + 	it
  (6) 
Based on the estimated coefficients 1 to 4 and 1 to 4, the degree of dissipation in the 
impact of a change in commuting time and labor income on subjective well-being can be 
simply calculated by dividing the sum of the coefficients for the lagged variables by the initial 
                                                
15 If income is kept constant, commuting time is expected to enter negatively into the equation. 
16 Due to lack of data, we cannot study adaptation to luxury housing. 
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effect, i.e. (2+3+4)/1 and (2+3+4)/1. To test for full adaptation, the hypotheses l
l=1
4
 = 0 
and  l
l=1
4
 = 0  are set up. 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
The two proposed empirical tests are performed with data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel Study (GSOEP). The GSOEP is one of the most valuable data sets for studying 
individual well-being over time. It was started in 1984 as a longitudinal survey of private 
households and persons in the Federal Republic of Germany and was extended to residents in 
the former German Democratic Republic in 1990. Reported subjective well-being is based on 
the question “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?” Responses range 
on a scale from 0 “completely dissatisfied” to 10 “completely satisfied”. In addition, people in 
the survey are asked a wide range of questions with regard to their socio-economic status and 
their demographic characteristics.  
Information on individual commuting time was collected in eight waves between 1985 and 
2003: 1985, 1990 and 1993 for the old German Laender, 1992 for the New German Laender 
and 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2003 for all the Laender. People were asked “How long does it 
normally take you to go all the way from your home to your place of work using the most 
direct route (one way only)?” In order to study adaptation based on the formulated strategy, 
information on commuting time is required annually. As there is detailed information in the 
GSOEP about changes in people’s jobs or places of residence, values for commuting time in 
intermediate years can easily be imputed. We follow a simple procedure. First, we check 
whether a person either changes his job and/or his place of residence between the waves for 
which commuting time is available. For those identified as movers, imputation of commuting 
time is possible using information about past and future commuting time. As long as they stay 
in the same job and place of residence, commuting time is carried forward from the last 
reported year to the following year(s) where the information is missing. Accordingly, for 
years in the past respondents stayed in the same job and residence, commuting time is 
imputed backwards. If someone only moves once between years with reported information on 
commuting time, commuting time can be imputed throughout. For those identified as non-
movers, commuting time between years with reported information is linearly interpolated. 
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The sample selection is based on the following criteria: First, we restrict the sample to those 
who either commute on a regular basis to the same workplace, or work at home, and report 
being either employed or self-employed. Second, we focus on people who are most likely to 
be equally involved in the household decision on where to live and work, i.e. the heads of 
households and their spouses. Third, as underemployment is a serious restriction to 
employees in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2006), we only include full 
time workers in the sample. On average, people in the selected sample commute 22 minutes 
one way, with a standard deviation of 18 minutes.  
4. Econometric Estimations for Incomplete Compensation 
The first empirical test extends previous work on commuting and life satisfaction by Stutzer 
and Frey (2008). The results of the earlier study are summarized and replicated for the 
extended data set with imputed data on commuting time. Moreover, they are integrated in the 
context of utility misprediction.  
In table 1, equation (5), which captures the effect of commuting time on life satisfaction, is 
estimated in a least squares regression (column A), taking a large number of individual 
characteristics into account, as well as year and individual specific effects.17 The latter 
exclude spurious correlations due to time-invariant unobserved characteristics of people that 
are systematically correlated with people’s commuting time and reported subjective well-
being.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The partial correlation reveals that commuting time has a negative effect on life satisfaction. 
People who spend one hour rather than 0 minutes commuting (one way) report, on average, a 
-0.115 points (t=-3.40) lower level of subjective well-being. For one standard deviation (i.e. 
18 minutes), the effect is -0.034 (t=-3.40). The size of the commuting effect for one standard 
deviation is one-eighth of the effect of finding or losing a partner for those being single. 
                                                
17 Here, only ordinary least squares estimations are reported. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that the 
answers can be cardinally interpreted. While the ranking information in reported subjective well-being 
would require ordered probit or logit regressions, comparative analyses for GSOEP have shown that it 
makes virtually no difference whether responses are treated ordinally or cardinally (Ferrer-i-Carbonel 
and Frijters 2004). The 11 categories of the dependent variable seem to mitigate potential problems 
from assuming continuity. 
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Compared to the effect of becoming unemployed (=-0.671) (see Stutzer and Frey 2004, table 
4), an increase in commuting time by one standard deviation (one hour) is about one twentieth 
(sixth) as bad for life satisfaction. 
This result is at odds with the benchmark prediction of standard location theory and the 
implicit assumption in many economic models that people are compensated, on average, for 
commuting. Rather, it is consistent with the view that people who mispredict utility and opt 
for too long a commuting time are trapped in a situation in which they are not compensated 
for the burden of commuting. 
A discussion of the results (not shown) for the socio-demographic and socio-economic 
covariates of life satisfaction in Germany can be found in Stutzer and Frey (2004) and Frijters 
et al. (2004). 
However, there might be alternative explanations for commuters not being fully 
compensated18. First, although commuting might be a burden for those involved, other 
members of the family might benefit so that, overall, the households’ well-being is equalized. 
But spouses are not reporting higher life satisfaction when their partners spend more time 
commuting. Moreover, the negative correlation is also found for single households where 
intra-household bargaining and altruism play much less of a role. Second, there are search 
models in urban and regional economics that build in transaction costs (e.g. Weinberg et al. 
1981, van Ommeren et al. 1997). They predict lower utility for those in a disadvantaged 
situation with long commuting times (e.g. van Ommeren 2000) and reckon that transaction 
costs prevent people from adjusting to economic shocks. In particular, transaction costs might 
hinder people who experience a longer or more disturbing commuting time ex post than 
expected ex ante from re-optimizing. Therefore, people might be locked into a disadvantaged 
commuting situation. It is very difficult to reject an explanation based on transaction costs, 
especially as transaction costs can easily systematically interact with our explanation based on 
utility misprediction. However, an albeit smaller negative effect of commuting time on life 
satisfaction is also estimated for people who either change their job and/or their place of 
residence and so have the opportunity of re-optimizing their commuting situation. For them, 
there might also well be an explanation in terms of economic costs not yet found and so not 
yet incorporated into the analysis. This cost factor would be interesting to know, because it 
potentially relates to a sizeable loss in well-being and should be explicitly modeled in urban 
                                                
18 Several of them are empirically addressed in Stutzer and Frey (2008). 
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and public economics. Until an adequate rational choice explanation has been provided, we 
propose the general result to be consistent with people mispredicting utility. 
5. Econometric Estimations for Differential Adaptation 
The results for the second empirical test based on equation (6) are also reported in table 1. 
The impact of the current commuting and working situation on life satisfaction is captured in 
column B. In addition to the negative partial correlation for commuting time, there is a 
statistically significant positive correlation between real labor income and workers’ well-
being. An increase in labor income by 50 percent corresponds to a 0.074 points higher 
satisfaction with life. 
Current and past levels of commuting time and labor income are taken into account in column 
C. The estimated coefficients for the lagged variables allude to a systematically different 
pattern. The levels of commuting one year back or two years back enter negatively into the 
estimation and thus hint at sensitization rather than adaptation to commuting. In contrast, past 
levels of labor income enter negatively into the equation and indicate adaptation, i.e. part of 
the positive impact of a higher income level is offset over time. Figure 1 shows the 
differential impact of past experiences graphically. For illustrative purposes, the path of 
reported life satisfaction is simulated for an increase in commuting time by 30 minutes and a 
simultaneous income increase of 50 percent in t=0. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The degree of adaptation based on the estimated coefficients for labor income, i.e. 
(2+3+4)/1, amounts to -0.70 or 70 percent. The degree of sensitization when experiencing a 
longer commuting time, (2+3+4)/ 1 is estimated to be around 0.24 or 24 percent. The main 
asymmetry is also reflected when the hypotheses of full adaptation are tested. l
l=1
4
 = 0 is 
rejected with prob > F = 0.033. In contrast,  l
l=1
4
 = 0  cannot be rejected (prob > F = 0.333). 
In sum, the observed asymmetry in the degree of adaptation to changes in the commuting/job 
situation is consistent with the general claim that adaptation is more pronounced for goods 
and activities that serve extrinsic needs rather than those that satisfy intrinsic needs. If people 
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have limited ability to predict adaptation, the asymmetry is carried forward to the 
misprediction of utility in commuting choices. The economic consequence is that people 
choose work/housing arrangements that involve too much commuting, for which they are not 
compensated, and thus experience reduced individual well-being. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper argues that individuals systematically mispredict the future utility of the goods 
consumed and activities undertaken. Goods and activities characterized by stronger intrinsic 
attributes (such as spending time with family and friends and pursuing hobbies) are 
undervalued compared to those characterized by stronger extrinsic attributes (such as most 
consumer goods). Due to the complexity of having to compare various attributes, learning is 
slow and imperfect, so that the distorted decisions are preserved over time. As a consequence, 
individuals experience a lower level of utility than if they were not subject to this systematic 
bias of misprediction. 
The result that individuals are worse off according to their own best interests distinguishes us 
from the more traditional “consumption critique”, according to which individuals are not able 
to choose what is best for them – but what is “best” is evaluated according to outside 
preferences.  
The argument synthesizes a multitude of phenomena, mainly from psychology, and related to 
utility (mis)prediction in a common framework. Thereby, the asymmetry in the extent of 
utility misprediction across goods and activities is emphasized. The proposed concept should 
assure the fruitful introduction of utility misprediction into economics in order to derive 
predictions about economic consequences in terms of individual behavior and individual 
welfare.  
In an empirical application, individuals’ commuting decisions are analyzed using data on 
subjective well-being. We find that people who spend more time commuting report lower life 
satisfaction, i.e. they are not fully compensated for the burden of commuting either by a 
higher salary, a better living environment or a lower rent. This is consistent with people 
overestimating future utility from the extrinsic attributes of job offers and housing options, 
and neglecting the intrinsic attributes, such as the physical burden of commuting and having 
less time available to spend with friends and family. In a refined analysis, the evidence for 
differences in the degree of adaptation is studied. It is found that full-time workers adapt, to a 
large extent, to a higher labor income over a period of three years. In contrast, people adapt 
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much less to commuting, and even seem to become increasingly sensitive toward the burden 
of commuting. This latter evidence adds to a consistent explanation of the commuting 
phenomenon in terms of utility misprediction. There is an asymmetry present in adaptation 
that leads to distorted choices, if adaptation is not taken into account in the evaluation of 
alternatives.  
Research on utility misprediction in economics is only in the initial stages. Fruitful next steps 
could go in many possible directions. While we focus on a specific characterization of goods 
and activities, there might be other areas where the degree of utility misprediction 
systematically differs. Inspiration might come from the analysis of further trade-offs that 
involve choice options that are difficult to evaluate. Further promising studies could be made. 
In the work sphere, these studies could be based on the decision to become self-employed or 
to do voluntary work. In the private sphere, these studies could focus on TV viewing, which is 
the most time-consuming leisure time activity in the Western World, and involved in many 
trade-offs in time allocation. Above all, we hope reading this article was not due to utility 
misprediction.  
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Table 1. Commuting and Life Satisfaction: Compensation and Adaptation 
Full time employed or self-employed people in Germany, 1984-2005 
Dependent variable: Satisfaction with life 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Commuting time t -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0020 
 (0.56e-3) (0.56e-3) (1.69e-3) 
     t-1   -0.49e-3 
   (1.99e-3) 
     t-2   -0.10e-3 
   (1.84e-3) 
     t-3   0.10e-3 
   (1.31e-3) 
Ln real labor income t not incl. 0.1828 0.1569 
  (0.015) (0.030) 
     t-1   -0.0256 
   (0.030) 
     t-2   -0.0232 
   (0.029) 
     t-3   -0.0606 
   (0.029) 
    
Working hours not incl. in year t incl. in years t-3 to t 
incl. 
Ind. characteristicsa incl. incl. incl. 
Individual fixed effects incl. incl. incl. 
Year fixed effects incl. incl. incl. 
    
No. of observations 85’332 85’332 37’368 
    
Notes: Partial correlations are from least square estimations. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. a Individual control variables include age square, nine 
variables for marital status, three variables for the number of children in the 
household, the square root of the number of household members and 
indicators for self-employment, residence in the New German Laender, 
foreigners with EU nationality, other foreigners and first interview. 
Data source: GSOEP. 
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Figure 1. Adaptation to Commuting and Labor Income 
Full time employed or self-employed people in Germany, 1984-2005 
 
Note: Simulation based on the estimated coefficients in table 1, panel C. 
Data source: GSOEP. 
